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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS IN
JUDGE BARKSDALE'S WRITINGS
Andrew C. W. Lund*
INTRODUCTION
It is my honor to contribute a piece to this wonderful collec-
tion commemorating Judge Barksdale's extraordinary career on
the bench. It was truly a privilege to clerk for the Judge and it is
no less so to have the opportunity to write a bit about his impact
on the law.
My task is to give readers a sense of Judge Barksdale's ju-
risprudence since his arrival on the bench in 1990. Summariz-
ing the Judge's written opinions is not easy. Judges on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals do not get to choose the cases they are as-
signed or, in large part, the opinions they must write. Moreover,
their opinions are significantly constrained by Supreme Court
and circuit court precedent. Summaries of circuit court judges'
written opinions tend to be a largely ad hoc collection of inter-
esting decisions that may or may not tie together. Having read
each of Judge Barksdale's published opinions, including dis-
sents, a number of broad common strands emerge-respect for
the law, judicial modesty, integrity and consistency over time
and between contexts, honesty, clarity, and a keen analytical
approach. Many of these have been aptly described by Chris
Green in these pages.'
Along this line, I hope in this Article to develop a particular
substantive lens through which an otherwise disparate set of
his opinions might come into sharper focus. Specifically, I think
it is useful to consider the heightened sensitivity to the role of
lawyers in Judge Barksdale's jurisprudence. The Judge's writ-
ings consistently show that he is particularly invested in the
view that attorneys ought to act with civility, integrity and
. Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School. B.A., Swathmore College; J.D.,
New York University School of Law; law clerk to Judge Barksdale 2002-2003.
1 See Christopher R. Green, Some Themes from Judge Rhesa H. Barksdale's Pub-
lished Opinions, 79 MISS. L.J. 261 (2009).
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competency. These expectations are grounded in the Judge's
experience as a judge-his recognition of the "faith, trust and
confidence" 2 that he must place in lawyers if he is to fulfill his
duties. Judge Barksdale's writings thus (1) advocate for high
professional standards, (2) reflect the central assumption that
those standards are being met unless there is significant evi-
dence to the contrary, and, (3) if such contrary evidence is
shown, take their violation very seriously. The point is not that
other judges do not do this, because surely all judges take law-
yers-their role, their behavior, etc.-seriously. Rather, it is
that Judge Barksdale's commitment to professionalism, broadly
defined, plays an important role in his jurisprudence.
This lens, though hopefully useful, is of course not univer-
sally applicable across the Judge's opinions. Writing about any
aspect of his opinions necessarily causes one to omit considera-
tion of a number of the Judge's most important decisions that
did not turn on the role of the attorneys. 3 Nevertheless, this im-
perfect interpretation is hopefully illuminating in at least one
regard. Judge Barksdale's deep respect for the role of lawyers
reflects his deep love and respect for the law itself. If law is to
retain its "majesty"4-if its integrity is to be sustained and its
application be honored-those who practice it must behave so as
to deserve the majesty, their actions reflecting the same integ-
rity and honor.
The link between lawyers' behavior and the law is clear to
Judge Barksdale. To get a sense of its importance to him, one
need go no further than "The Role of Civility in Appellate Advo-
cacy," an article he contributed to a South Carolina Law Review
2 Rhesa H. Barksdale, The Role of Civility in Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV.
573, 579 (1999) [hereinafter "The Role of Civility"].
Judge Barksdale's opinions have been frequently cited by other courts and in
secondary sources. Among his most "popular" opinions in terms of judicial citations are:
Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2001); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir.
2001); Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1999); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996); Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086 (5th
Cir. 1995); and Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94 (5th Cir. 1994).
Academics have most often cited: GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir.
2003); Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, (5th Cir. 1996); Ellison v. Soft-
ware Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, (5th Cir. 1996); and Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S.
Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, (5th Cir. 1994).
4 See The Role of Civility, supra note 2, at 580.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
symposium on appellate advocacy generally. In it, the Judge
makes a compelling case that lawyers who practice civilly-that
is, thoughtfully and courteously 5 -are more effective than those
who use, for instance, "scorched-earth" tactics. 6
The Judge's point is not necessarily obvious given pop cul-
ture's preference for hard-nosed, antagonistic attorneys and the
natural assumption that such tactics are necessary to achieve
the best outcome for one's clients. Nevertheless, Judge
Barksdale convincingly argues that incivility by appellate advo-
cates (though the point can easily be extended to all forms of
advocacy) is truly harmful to their clients' causes. Such incivil-
ity "diminishes respect for the law" and erects a roadblock to-
ward the goal of reaching a "fair, prompt, efficient and relatively
inexpensive resolution" to the matter at hand.7 As a strategic
matter, the incivility harms the client because "[t]he court can-
not place faith, trust, or confidence in the [client's] lawyer."8
More globally, if judges cannot place faith in lawyers, "there can
be no appellate advocacy."9 The article thus serves as practical
advice for individual lawyers as well as a mission statement of
sorts for appellate litigation: the entire project depends on cer-
tain standards being met by lawyers.
Judge Barksdale's article focused on civility, but civility is
certainly not the only characteristic of lawyers key to function-
ing appellate courts. While there are certainly others, this Arti-
cle raises two more aspects of lawyering that seem to hold a par-
ticularly elevated place in the Judge's jurisprudence: integrity
and competency. A presumption of these three (including civil-
ity) norms pervades an eclectic subset of Judge Barksdale's
opinions. From the obvious cases (attorney sanctions, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims) to the less so (standing, the right
against self-incrimination), many of the Judge's opinions
hearken back to the foundational belief that lawyers are impor-
tant, that their integrity, competency and civility are to be ex-
5 Judge Barksdale summed up the concept as "disagree[ing] without being dis-
agreeable." Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
6 Id. at 574.
Id. at 577.
8 Id. at 579.
9 Id.
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pected and that incursions on any of those expectations are to be
met by a serious response.
Attorney's Fees, Sanctions and Civility
When lawyers fail to act civilly, Judge Barksdale does not
stand idly by. Before reviewing some of his opinions on judicial
sanctions for attorney misbehavior, it is worth noting that the
Judge has expressed his deep concern for civility and profes-
sionalism in at least one other context-attorney's fee awards.
In Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., the Judge concurred in part and
dissented in part from a decision that affirmed a $12,000 award
for emotional distress in a Title VII employment discrimination
case, remanding the case to the district court on the issue of the
$81,000 fee award for plaintiffs counsel. 10 The Judge concurred
with the decision to remand on these fees but stated that he
would have gone further and given more guidance to the district
court to significantly reduce the award. 1
In the case, the plaintiff and her lawyer had entered into a
contingency fee arrangement. During the pendency of the litiga-
tion, the plaintiff (presumably with advice from counsel) had
rejected a settlement offer for an amount only slightly less than
the $12,000 that she would ultimately win months later. From
the case's inception through its conclusion, the plaintiffs lawyer
had spent a significant number of hours on claims that ulti-
mately failed. Finally, as described above, the lawyer's award
was over six times the damages won by the plaintiff.
To the Judge, plaintiffs counsel's behavior reeked of incivil-
ity-of unreasonableness.1 2 Prefacing his treatment of the issue,
he noted:
I fear that this [lodestar] procedure is being applied in keeping
with the times, with the idea that nothing deserves something,
and, especially in that regard, that lawyers must be hand-
somely rewarded, notwithstanding that their labors bore little,
10 135 F.3d 1041, 1047-49 (5th Cir. 1998) (Barksdale, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
11 Id. at 1050.
12 Id. at 1049-66 (returning to the concepts of "reason" and "reasonableness" in
relation to attorney's fees numerous times).
[VOL.79:2304
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
if any, fruit .... Reason and reasonableness are missing in ac-
tion. Excess has become an art form.13
In the opinion, he suggested that the district court consider
the foregone settlement, the allocation of time spent on success-
ful and unsuccessful claims and the relative paucity of plaintiffs
recovery for purposes of arriving at a reasonable attorney's fee
award. 14 This went further than the majority, which only re-
manded based on the disparity between the damages and fee. 15
Judge Barksdale's opinion was not merely a determination
that the lawyer in the particular case did not deserve to be re-
warded as handsomely as he had been. It also reflected a call for
the judiciary to actively raise the level of lawyers' behavior via
close inspection of their actions before awarding fees. The sys-
tem of incentives for attorneys produced inappropriate behavior
-in this case the failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer
and the waste of resources on unpromising theories. If the law
needs lawyers to behave with civility, integrity and honesty,
Judge Barksdale believed judges must work to recalibrate the
fee incentives to encourage such behavior. 16 Looking solely to
the result-the ratio between damages and fees-risked produc-
ing a lottery mentality among lawyers and its concomitant di-
minishment of the characteristics so valued by the Judge. More
stringent scrutiny of the process actually undertaken by the
lawyer-the settlements rejected and the theories improperly
pursued-was necessary to stop the backsliding. While noting
the importance of efficient judicial oversight of fee questions,
Judge Barksdale concluded that his potentially more time-
consuming approach is necessary given the principle at stake. 17
13 Id. at 1050.
14 Id. at 1056.
15 Id. at 1048.
11 See id. at 1065 ("We bemoan the too often seen lack of civility and professionalism
and ethics, as well as the pursuit by some lawyers of, not excellence, but numbing medi-
ocrity .... Reason and reasonableness can be restored; but, only when we are willing to
do so.").
17 Id. at 1056. ("Admittedly, and as noted, a request for attorney's fees should not
result in a second major litigation. Nor do we require the district court's . . . analysis to
be so excruciatingly explicit that decisions of fee awards consume more paper than did
the cases from which they arose.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
20091 305
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The most well-known example of the Judge responding to a
lack of civility by a lawyer is his original dissent18 and subse-
quent majority en banc opinion 19 in Whitehead v. Food Max of
Mississippi, Inc. In Whitehead, after winning a verdict for his
client against Kmart for the latter's failure to provide security
in its parking lot, plaintiffs counsel obtained a writ of execution
for the $3.4 million judgment.20 Before executing the writ, the
lawyer notified members of the media as to his plans and pro-
ceeded to enter the local Kmart and attempt to seize cash from
the store's registers and vault. Despite only a three-day lapse
between the denial of Kmart's motion for remittitur or a new
trial and his entering the Kmart, the lawyer protested to the
reporters present about Kmart's arrogance and failure to pay its
debt.21
Kmart sought sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the motion based,
in part,22 on plaintiffs counsel entering the Kmart in order to
embarrass the company and self-promote. Counsel later explic-
itly confirmed these motives. 23 On appeal, a divided panel held
that the lawyer's behavior was "patently inappropriate," 24 but
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, no improper purpose
should be presumed under Rule 11 when the relevant docu-
ments-in this case, the writ-were otherwise legitimately
filed.25 Instead, the majority would leave it to other state au-
thorities to handle the matter of counsel's incivility. 26
Judge Barksdale dissented from the court's washing its
hands of the matter. He noted that the facts at hand repre-
18 277 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 2002) (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
19 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
20 That judgment was eventually vacated. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss.,
Inc., 163 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1998).
21 277 F.3d at 797-98.
22 The district court also held counsel had failed to reasonably inquire into the law
regarding execution on judgments because an automatic 10-day stay was in effect when
he entered the Kmart. The en banc opinion in Whitehead ultimately held that counsel
had not made a reasonable inquiry, but held that the "improper purpose" ground for
sanctions was sufficient in any event. See 332 F.3d at 804-05.
23 Id. at 807.
24 277 F.3d at 796-97 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 796.
26 Id. at 797.
[VOL.79:2
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
sented exactly the kind of "exceptional circumstances" the ma-
jority would require. When the purpose of obtaining the writ
was as obviously improper as it was in the case, Rule 11 sanc-
tions were appropriate. Consistent with the views he had ex-
pressed elsewhere, the Judge considered counsel's actions not
merely an affront to Kmart, but also an attack on the judicial
process and the rule of law. Because they are so important, the
damage that lawyers can cause is all the greater. Courts have
an obligation to supervise, through Rule 11 among other
mechanisms, the behavior of lawyers who practice before
them.27 To the Judge, hoping for another entity to put a stop to
atrocious behavior was not appropriate.
The Judge's view prevailed when the case was taken en
banc. Writing the majority opinion upholding sanctions, Judge
Barksdale conceded that civility and ethics rules are to gener-
ally be enforced by other bodies, 28 but he concluded that courts
do have a clearly prescribed role to play-the one given to them
by Rule 11-in enforcing some norms. 29 Against this view,
Judge King dissented on the grounds that intent to embarrass
and self-promote are too commonly found to constitute excep-
tional circumstances, given the potentially legitimate purpose in
filing the writ.30 On the one hand, Judge King's dissent stems
from the potential chaos generated by allowing widely-observed,
if unsavory, characteristics to form the basis of sanctions.
On the other, her disagreement seems to flow from a toler-
ant view of certain litigation behavior: "We, as appellate judges,
operate at a far remove from the business of collecting judg-
ments or effecting settlements. We ought to refrain from excori-
ating a lawyer based upon our own sensibilities .... ,,31 Here,
Judge King's criticism is not explicitly based on efficiency. In-
stead, it seems based on a degree of uncertainty about how
strictly the norm of civility ought to be set regardless of the cost
its enforcement would entail.
27 Id. at 797 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
28 332 F.3d at 808.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 814 (King, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 815.
2009] 307
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While sensitive to the inefficiencies created by requiring
mini-trials on attorney behavior,32 Judge Barksdale was much
more certain of the need for high standards of behavior for law-
yers. The reasons for this-the link he sees between attorney
behavior and the legal system-has been discussed above. What
the Whitehead opinions and Judge Barksdale's refusal to shrug
off a lawyer's incivility proves is that he is willing to stand up
for that connection. Against the cynicism that many of us feel
about the civility, integrity, and competency of lawyers, the
Judge refuses to "dumb down" his expectations for the bar.33
Crediting Lawyers' Integrity
This refusal to lower expectations has a secondary effect.
Because the Judge expects so much from lawyers, he grants
them a great deal of respect. This makes all the sense in the
world because, after all, imposing high standards on lawyers is
based on their importance to the overall project. Thus, the same
theme leads to the judge regularly placing a great deal of faith
in lawyers' competency and integrity.
In Guidry v. Dretke,34 Judge Barksdale wrote the majority
opinion for a divided panel upholding a district court's grant of
habeas relief to Howard Guidry who had been convicted of mur-
der for remuneration and sentenced to death by a Texas state
court. The habeas claim was based on an alleged violation of
Guidry's right against self-incrimination. For present purposes,
the Judge's wide-ranging opinion is notable because of the
weight it accorded to testimony by lawyers concerning state-
ments made to them by the police officers.
32 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33 For another example of the Judge taking on intemperate counsel, see Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1994). In Travelers, defen-
dants appealed a district court judge's refusal to recuse himself in their civil case when
the judge belonged to social organizations in which colleagues of plaintiffs counsel and
directors of the plaintiff were members. In addition to filing a motion filled with "in-
temperate (if not contemptuous)" allegations, defense counsel actually released a song
attacking the integrity of the district court. Id. at 1408-09 & 1409 n.6. The Judge de-
nied defendants' appeal on the merits and further held that the appeals were designed
to harass and therefore sanctions appropriate. See id. at 1413.
- 397 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005).
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In March 1995, the officers had questioned Guidry, in jail at
the time pending an unrelated bank robbery charge. During this
questioning, Guidry confessed to participating in the murder for
remuneration. The circumstances surrounding the confession
were controversial. Guidry claimed that he had requested his
attorney (retained for the robbery charge) prior to the interroga-
tion and had been subsequently told by detectives that the at-
torney agreed that the questioning could continue outside of his
presence. The detectives, on the other hand, claimed that
Guidry had never asked for his lawyer and that they had never
spoken to his robbery attorney.
Crucially, Guidry's attorneys for the murder trial stated
(along with another attorney who had no connection with
Guidry) that the same detectives told the attorneys that they
(the detectives) had been given permission by Guidry's robbery
attorney to question Guidry on the murder charge. Confronted
with this testimony, the detectives asserted that they said no
such thing to the murder-case attorneys. After conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the state trial court denied Guidry's motion
to suppress the confession, and Guidry was later convicted.
Guidry pursued state habeas relief and was denied. He filed
a federal petition and requested an evidentiary proceeding re-
garding the involuntary confession issue. The district court
agreed to do so, and subsequently granted the habeas petition.
The state centered its appeal to the Fifth Circuit on dual claims
that the district court (1) abused its discretion in holding an
evidentiary hearing when such a hearing could only serve to
rehash testimony from state court and (2) improperly substi-
tuted its credibility determinations for those of the state court
after the evidentiary hearing.
Judge Barksdale wrote the opinion for the panel majority,
upholding the district court's decision. On the evidentiary hear-
ing issue, the opinion noted first that the district court had no
way of knowing whether the witnesses' testimony would be the
same during the second hearing. Moreover, the deference owed
to state courts under AEDPA did not prevent the district court
from testing the unreasonableness of the state court's factual
2009] 309
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determinations through an evidentiary hearing. 35 Notably, the
fact that lawyers had testified in state court seemed to matter
greatly. The state court's implicit conclusion that the lawyers
testified falsely was, to the majority, "too extraordinary to avoid
development through an evidentiary hearing in district court."36
That is, the presumption of lawyers' integrity warranted a
closer look.
As to the district court's substantive determination, Judge
Barksdale's opinion naturally focused on the four lawyers' tes-
timony. The state court had discussed the conflicting testimony
of Guidry and the detectives, but not that of the lawyers and the
detectives. The opinion continued:
The state trial court's omission, without explanation, of find-
ings on evidence crucial to Guidry's habeas claim, where the
witnesses are apparently credible, brought into question
whether [the decision was unreasonable]. After reviewing the
demeanor of [the d]etectives ... while observing the credible
testimony of the four lawyers and Guidry, the district court...
was in an even better position not to accept the trial court's
findings. 37
The opinion does not say so, but one is left with the distinct
impression that the witnesses' status as lawyers made them
particularly credible. Such a determination would be entirely
consistent with the Judge's more general commitment to pro-
moting, expecting, and respecting excellence in lawyering.
Crediting Lawyers' Competency - Ineffective Assistance Claims
Along with a rebuttable presumption of lawyers' integrity, a
rebuttable presumption of lawyers' competency runs through
Judge Barksdale's opinions. The "rebuttable" qualifier is key-
although the Judge might presume lawyerly competency as an
initial matter, of course the facts of any case lead wherever they
35 In fact, Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts specifically contemplates the district court's discretion to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing, subject to § 2254(e)(2)'s bar on evidentiary hearings to develop facts not
presented by the petitioner in the state court. See Guidry, 397 F.3d at 323.
3 Id. at 324.
37 Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
do. Nevertheless, the presumption of reasonable and skillful
behavior by lawyers is apparent.
Obviously, the question of lawyer competency often arises
in the context of Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel ("IAC") claims. In truth, Sixth Amendment opinions-
especially habeas claims based on state convictions-are not
likely to show very much about a judge's view of lawyerly com-
petency. First, given the deference accorded to state habeas de-
cisions under AEDPA38 and the high burden required to prove
deficient performance in any IAC analysis, 39 it is hard for judges
to act in good faith and not have their opinions reflect the pre-
sumption of competency described this Article would attribute
to Judge Barksdale. Moreover, because courts are able to omit a
discussion of deficient performance and simply rely on there
being no prejudice to the defendant under the test for IAC, 40
there are relatively few decisions that even tackle the issue of
deficient performance vel non at all.
Nevertheless, it is unsurprising that Judge Barksdale rec-
ognizes the difficult and sensitive nature of defense counsel's
work when conducting an IAC analysis. For instance, in St.
Aubin v. Quarterman,41 the Judge refused to find that defense
counsel performed deficiently by not raising his client's mental-
health history during the punishment stage of his murder trial.
He concluded that the decision to avoid opening the door to prior
bad acts associated with that history was likely the result of a
thoughtful litigation strategy.42
While recognizing the discretion necessarily granted coun-
sel over strategic matters, the Judge is willing to entertain defi-
- 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2006) (review only to determine if state decisions were
unreasonable application of facts or law).
39 See, e.g., Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[Jludicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and courts must indulge in a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance" under the first-part of Strickland's test for JAC).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 769 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1985).
41 470 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 2006)
42 Id. at 1103. See also United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1301-04 (5th Cir.
1992), in which Judge Barksdale observed the competence of defense counsel where (1)
the complained-of failure consisted only of the failure to raise Fourth Amendment issues
for which his client had no standing and (2) counsel aggressively cross-examined prose-
cution witnesses.
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cient performance claims in cases of simple negligence. In Ladd
v. Cockrell, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death after a sentencing phase in which defense
counsel put forth no mitigating evidence regarding the defen-
dant's difficult childhood. 43 Judge Barksdale's opinion noted
that defense counsel's failure to investigate further when the
fact of a juvenile arrest was raised and no juvenile records had
been provided to him could be deficient performance (when cou-
pled with the failure to provide any mitigating evidence). 44
St. Aubin and Ladd become easily reconcilable when one
places them in the context of Judge Barksdale's commitment to
lawyers. To the Judge, thoughtfully considering litigation op-
tions is the heart of a lawyer's job. Thus, he will not counte-
nance second-guessing of those good faith decisions. However,
negligence like the kind alleged in Ladd is to be rejected at all
times. Avoiding using hindsight to evaluate strategic decisions
while chiding attorneys for a failure of appropriate effort re-
flects the balance in the Judge's opinions between expectations
of, and respect for, lawyers.
Crediting Lawyers' Competency - Standing
The view of lawyers as essentially competent unless dem-
onstrated otherwise shows up elsewhere. For instance, in Doe v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board,45 a father brought a claim
against the local school district on the grounds that the school
board's practice of praying before meetings violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. Judge Barksdale authored the majority opin-
ion for the three-judge panel, concluding that the prayers fell
outside any legislative prayer exception because they were uni-
formly Christian. 46
43 311 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir. 2002).
44 Id. at 359. The opinion concluded that, in any event, the defendant was not
prejudiced by the arguably deficient performance. Id. at 359-60. See also Burdine v.
Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 2000) (prejudice not required to be presumed under law
at time of conviction when defense counsel slept for unidentified segments of trial), reh'g
granted en banc, vacated by 234 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 2000).
45 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006), reh'g granted en banc, vacated by 478 F.3d 679 (5th
Cir. 2006).
46 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (establishing exception). Judge
Barksdale's opinion assumed arguendo that Marsh could be applied to school board
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
In the father's original amended complaint, he asserted
that he had attended school board meetings that began with
prayer. In response, the board denied that assertion, but only
for lack of information. Eventually, the sides agreed to a consent
judgment leaving the Establishment Clause question as the
only open issue. At that point, they also agreed to a set of stipu-
lated facts, none of which specifically addressed the father's at-
tendance at meetings or standing generally. The order regard-
ing the stipulations, however, did note that the father and his
sons would, if necessary, testify as to the facts alleged in the
amended complaint. 47 At no point in the proceedings before the
district court or the court of appeals did the board contest the
father's standing or suggest that the father had not attended
the board meetings.
In his panel opinion, the Judge dealt with the issue of
standing sua sponte. He held that the board's failure to (1) chal-
lenge the father's assertion from the amended complaint or (2)
contest standing more generally was an implied admission that
the father had, in fact, attended a meeting: "[T]he [b]oard's deci-
sion to proceed on the merits of [the father's] claim, without
challenging either that he attended [b]oard meetings or was of-
fended by them, permits an inference that the [b]oard conceded
these allegations in [the] complaint." 48
Judge Barksdale's implied admission analysis in his panel
opinion rested on a fundamental view of lawyerly competence.
Standing cannot be waived, 49 but the facts supporting its exis-
tence can be conceded. The question is whether to take the
board's silence in the face of the allegations in the amended
complaint as a concession regarding the factual allegation of the
father's attendance. This, in turn, depends largely on one's view
of the board's lawyers. If the board's lawyers were competent,
meetings. But see 473 F.3d at 205 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contending that the Marsh
exception did not apply to such meetings).
47 See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 510-11 (5th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (Benavides, J., dissenting).
48 473 F.3d at 195. Additionally, the opinion analogized to Rule 15(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows that "When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b); see also 473 F.3d at 195.
49 494 F.3d at 501 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
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their failure to challenge the complaint's allegations or the
standing issue generally can be attributed meaning. Given an
obviously important issue in their client's interest (the father's
possible lack of standing) and an obviously adverse allegation in
the complaint (that the father attended a meeting), a competent
lawyer would raise his or her hand if there was something
amiss. If, on the other hand, one is more skeptical of the law-
yers' competence, their failure to fight on standing is of little
probative value.
The issue was not discussed by either the concurrence or
dissent in the original opinion. However, after a majority of the
circuit's judges voted to rehear the decision en banc,50 the stand-
ing question became the crux of the case. Chief Judge Jones,
writing the majority opinion, refused to infer anything regard-
ing the father's attendance from the board's failure to dispute
the allegation in the amendment or the standing issue. 51 Where
the stipulated facts omitted anything on that score the majority
held that there was no reliable information to be gleaned from
the board's lawyers' failure to contest standing or the factual
allegations in the amended complaint.
In his dissent to the en banc opinion, Judge Barksdale re-
capitulated much of his analysis in the panel opinion. In par-
ticular, he highlighted the view of lawyer competency underpin-
ning the implied-admission analysis: "Surely, had the [board]
felt the [father] lacked standing, it would not have stipulated as
it did, including.., the four prayers that had been presented at
[board] meetings .... Simply put, the [board] more than recog-
nized its requisite adversarial position with the [plaintiffs]. '"52
This conclusion was further supported, again assuming a cer-
tain level of lawyer competence, by the failure of the board to
dispute the father's attendance on appeal before the en banc
court.
53
50 See id. at 496 (noting that the standing issue was raised by the en banc court sua
sponte and subjected to supplemental briefing).
51 Id. at 497. Chief Judge Jones also wrote that implying admissions regarding
standing was impermissible in any event. See id. (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1998)).
52 Id. at 508-09 (Barksdale J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 507 (noting that the board did not address the standing issue until
prompted by the court).
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
It would be folly to expect the themes discussed above to
provide an interpretive key for the whole of Judge Barksdale's
writings. But hopefully the recurring role that his view of law-
yers plays in his opinions sheds a bit of light on his jurispru-
dence. Along this line, it demonstrates a bit more about what
the Judge's opinions have meant for the law-they have served
as a call to pay greater respect to, and expect more from, law-
yers.
CONCLUSION
For those of us fortunate enough to have been able to have
one, a clerkship offers not just an inside view of the justice sys-
tem but also an introduction to being a lawyer. Those of us who
have had the privilege of clerking for Judge Barksdale received
the most wonderful of such introductions imaginable. The Judge
as a boss is brilliant, warm and funny. But so are others whom
we have met and will meet during our careers after leaving his
chambers. To me, what separates Judge Barksdale is the way
he forced me to take my profession-and, by extension, myself-
seriously.
The importance of this norm-setting cannot be overstated.
At the beginning of my clerkship I would work diligently pri-
marily because I did not want to let the Judge down. At some
point during the year, I had internalized his ethic of profession-
alism so that I did those things because I understood that ex-
treme diligence was the price of being a lawyer. This view is
largely due to the standards the judge set, both implicitly and
explicitly, for lawyers-himself, those of us who worked for him
and the members of the bar that practiced before him. Those
lessons are not always easily applied-they require us to main-
tain integrity when it may be advantageous to cut corners, to
act competently when it would be easier to let things slide, to
behave civilly when the alternative is appealing to say the least.
But they are the necessary conclusions for anyone considering
the role of lawyers in our society. Lawyers' integrity, compe-
tency, and civility are critical because lawyers are critical.
Judge Barksdale's writings demonstrate his view that to believe
otherwise is to make a serious error. His opinions offer those
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who read them a chance to learn a few of the lessons that his
clerks are lucky enough to have learned first-hand.
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